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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y  
hen do governments 
decide to interfere 
with the Internet, 
and why?  While many 
observers celebrate the 
creative use of digital media 
by activists and civil society 
leaders, there are a 
significant number of 
incidents involving 
government-led Internet 
shutdowns.  Governments 
have offered a range of 
reasons for interfering with 
digital networks, employed many tactics, and experienced both costs and benefits in 
doing so. 
When and why do states disconnect their digital networks is a principle question 
we examine in this paper.  To answer this question, we built an event history 
database of incidents in which a regime went beyond mere surveillance of particular 
websites or users, and actually disconnected Internet exchange points or blocked 
significant amounts of certain kinds of traffic. All in all, there were 606 unique 
incidents involving 99 countries since 1995:  39 percent of the incidents occurred in 
democracies, 6 percent occurred in emerging democracies, 52 percent occurred in 
authoritarian regimes, and 3 percent occurred in fragile states. Then we developed 
three standardized typologies for the kinds of incidents being reported.  First, we 
developed a category that iteratively helped define the case, and a typology of actions 
that states take against social media.  Second, we developed a category for why they 
took that action, sometimes relying on third-party reports if the state simply denied 
any interference.  Finally, we developed a category for the impact of the interference. 
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We find that overall more democracies participate in network interventions than 
authoritarian regimes. However, authoritarian regimes conduct shutdowns with 
greater frequency. After 2002, authoritarian governments clearly began using such 
interference as tool of governance. In recent years, even fragile states have interfered 
with domestic information infrastructure, usually as a last effort at maintaining social 
control. 
 
Regime Responses to the Political Use of Social Media 
Between January and April 2011, public demand for political reform cascaded from 
Tunis to Cairo, Sana’a, Amman and Manama. This inspired people in Casablanca, 
Damascus, Tripoli and dozens of other secondary cities to take to the streets to 
demand change. By May, the political casualties were significant: Tunisia’s Ben Ali 
and Egypt’s Mubarak, two of the region’s most recalcitrant dictators, were gone; 
Libya was locked in a civil war; several constitutional monarchs had sacked their 
cabinets and committed to constitutional reforms (and some several times over). 
Governments around the region had sued for peace by promising their citizens 
hundreds of billions of dollars in new spending measures for infrastructure projects, 
family and unemployment benefits, free or subsidized food, salary increases for civil 
servants and military personnel, tax cuts, affordable-housing subsidies, and social 
security programs. Morocco and Saudi Arabia appeared to fend off serious domestic 
uprisings, but the outcomes for regimes in Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen were 
far from certain. Democratization movements had existed long before technologies 
such as mobile phones and the Internet came to these countries. But with these 
technologies, pro-democracy agitators built extensive networks, created social capital, 
and organized political action. With these technologies, virtual networks materialized 
in the streets. 
As a desperate measure, many states tried to choke off information flows between 
activists, and between activists and the rest of the world. Mubarak tried to disconnect 
his citizens from the global information infrastructure in the last week of January 
2011. It was a desperate maneuver with mixed impact. A small group of tech-savvy 
students and civil society leaders had organized satellite phones and dialup 
connections to Israel and Europe, so they were able to keep up strong links to the rest 
of the world. It appears that some of the telecommunications engineers acted slowly 
on the order to choke off Internet access.  The first large Internet service provider was 
asked to shut down on Friday, January 28, but engineers didn’t respond until 
Saturday. Other providers responded quickly, but returned to normal service on 
Monday. The amount of bandwidth going into Egypt dropped off for four days, but it 
was not the information blackout Mubarak had asked for. Taking down the nation’s 
information infrastructure also crippled government agencies. The people most 
affected were middle-class Egyptians, who were cut off from Internet service at home. 
Some people certainly stayed there, isolated and uncertain about the status of their 
friends and family. But in the absence of information about the crisis, others took to 
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the streets, eager to find out what was going on. 
This was not the first wave of incidents in which governments disconnected their 
citizens from global information flows.1
Compared to protests that occurred the last time elections were stolen, the social 
movement lasted longer, it drew in millions more participants, and there were more 
witnesses to the brutal regime crackdown.  Social media had a clear role in extending 
the life of civil disobedience.  While the theocratic regime did not fall, there were 
some important outcomes: the ruling mullahs were split in opinion about the severity 
of the crackdown.  As part of the response, the regime attempted to disable national 
mobile phone networks. It disconnected the national Internet information 
infrastructure for several hours, and installed a deep packet inspection system that 
significantly slowed traffic.
  On Friday, June 12, 2009, Iran voted.  When 
voters realized the election had been rigged, many took to the streets to protest.  
Social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and SMS messaging was actively used to 
coordinate the movements of protesters and to get images and news out to the 
international community.   
2  Even today, the Iranian regime claims to be building the 
capacity to completely disconnect its public from global digital infrastructure.3
For civil society actors around the world, digital media and online social 
networking applications have changed the way in which dissent is organized.
 
4  Social 
movement leaders from around the world use online applications and digital content 
systems to organize collective action, activate local protest networks, network with 
international social movements, and share their political perspective with global 
media networks.5
It is certainly more difficult to control digital media on a regular basis, but there 
have been occasions in which states have disabled a range of marginal to significant 
portions of their national information infrastructure. What situational tendencies 
cause state-powers to exercise specific acts of blocking Internet access and disabling 
digital networks?  When do regimes resort to the more extreme measures of shutting 
off Internet access? And when they do not have the capacity to control digital 
networks, how do states respond offline to dissent and criticism? What is the impact 
of doing so, and who is most affected? 
 In the past, authoritarian regimes easily controlled broadcast media 
in times of political crisis; by destroying newsprint supplies, seizing radio and 
television stations, and blocking phone calls. 
It is difficult to investigate patterns of state censorship. Many reports of 
censorship are essentially self-reports by technology users who assume there is a 
political reason behind their inability to connect to a digital network, whether they 
are mobile phone networks, gaming networks, or the Internet. Sometimes the state 
admits to acts of censorship, which makes it easier to learn why the government 
interfered and to what effect.  Other times the state acts so clumsily or breaks the 
communication link between such large networks, that many users can report being 
affected.  While several researchers study the broad social impact of censorship, there 
are only a few who are able to provide evidence about both the shared perception 
that the state is surveilling its public, and specific incidents of censorship that involve 
For civil society 
actors around the 
world, digital media 
and online social 
networking 
applications have 
changed the way in 
which dissent is 
organized. 
  The Dictators’ Digital Dilemma: When Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks?  
 
4 
disconnections in digital networks.6
Not all incidents involve authoritarian regimes, and not all acts of state censorship 
are easy to describe and classify.  One of the first incidents occurred on December 29, 
1995, when German prosecutors demanded that an Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
block 4 million worldwide subscribers from reading sex-related information on 
portions of the Internet. This was the first instance of such drastic measures of state 
censorship, legislation, and regulation of information received online. Motivation for 
the shutdown came from a police investigation into child pornography in Bavaria, 
Germany. Though German officials were targeting 220,000 German subscribers when 
they asked for the block, CompuServe had no mechanism in place to limit just 
German users at the time, thus; they shut down service to all subscribers. In all, 
CompuServe restricted subscriber access to 200 newsgroups, specifically related to 
the site Usenet. Reaction to the censorship elicited varied responses from community 
and civic groups. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, for 
example, hailed it as a form of “electronic citizenship.” Meanwhile, groups such as 
the Electronic Freedom Foundation indicated concern and resistance to the notion of 
state control over individual rights online. 
 Drawing from multiple sources, however, it is 
possible to do a comparative analysis of the myriad incidents in which government 
officials decide to censor their online publics.  By collecting as many known incidents 
of state intervention in information networks, we are able to map out the contours of 
crisis situations, political risks, and civic innovations to understand the new 
intersections between state power and civil society. 
This early incident of state intervention with Internet connectivity brought forth 
questions that we still struggle to answer today: Who controls Internet content?   
What are the legitimate reasons for state interference with digital networks?  Over the 
last 15 years, we find that states are increasingly willing to interfere with the links 
between nodes of digital infrastructure by shutting out particular users or shutting off 
particular servers, by breaking the links to sub-networks of digital media, and 
sometimes even by disconnecting national information infrastructure from global 
networks. 
Since 1995—the year the National Science Foundation effectively privatized the 
Internet—there have been at least 606 occasions in which governments intervened in 
the connections of a digital network. Of these, about half were enacted by 
authoritarian regimes. The three countries with the highest number of incidents, 
China, Tunisia, and Turkey, represent both authoritarian and democratic regimes.  In 
times of political uncertainty, rigged elections, or military incursions, ruling elites are 
sometimes willing to interfere with information infrastructure as a way of managing 
crises.  In many of these cases, the targets (victims) are active domestic civil society 
movements with international linkages. When these movements organize, 
authoritarian governments can react harshly and invasively by blocking access to the 
global Internet. Yet at the same time, these authoritarian regimes find that they 
cannot block Internet access for extended periods, both because doing so has an 
impact on the national economy and because of international political pressure.  
Shutting off the Internet for a country’s network also has an impact on the capacity of 
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the state to respond to the crisis—for example, Egyptian authorities did not expect 
that turning off Internet and SMS networks would draw out protesters in larger 
numbers to the street.  Therefore, the decision tree for choking off Internet access also 
involves some willingness to incapacitate portions of the government’s security 
apparatus.  Increasingly, civil society groups find methods to circumvent the blocked 
social media.   A significant corpus of literature has grown around the use of newer 
digital media by social movements against authoritarian regimes.7
We conducted a comparative case analysis of the occasions in which regimes 
disconnected significant portions of their national digital infrastructure, including 
mobile phones and Internet access.  Our goal is to define the range of situations in 
which states have actually disrupted large sections of their own national information 
infrastructure. Through a grounded comparison of incidents, we demonstrate the 
importance of understanding how information technologies have a role in political 
responses and counter-insurgency tactics of many kinds of regimes. Such 
comparative study will help explicate the meaning of contemporary state power in 
media systems of both advanced and developing countries.  While some have argued 
that the state no longer has strong control of media production and consumption 
systems, there are a range of occasions in which state power over digital networks is 
noticeably strong. 
   
 
Rising Rates of Government Interference 
Over time, the number of incidents involving state interference with Internet 
infrastructure has increased dramatically.8
 
 States interfere with digital networks 
using many tactics, with various levels of severity:  online, by shutting down political 
websites or portals; offline, by arresting journalists, bloggers, activists, and citizens; 
by proxy, through controlling Internet service providers, forcing companies to shut 
down specific websites or denying access to disagreeable content; and, in the most 
extreme cases, shutting down access to entire online and mobile networks. 
Surprisingly, while authoritarian regimes practice controlling full-networks, sub-
networks, and nodes more than democracies, democracies are the most likely to 
target civil society actors by proxy by manipulating Internet service providers. 
Governments exercised control by targeting full-networks (shutting down the 
Internet), sub-networks (blocking websites), network-nodes (targeting individuals), 
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Figure 1 reveals that until about 2002, the majority of states interfering with their 
domestic information infrastructure were democracies. After 2002, authoritarian 
governments clearly began using such interference as tool of governance.  In recent 
years, even fragile states have interference with domestic information infrastructure, 
usually as a last effort at maintaining social control.   
While we might expect authoritarian regimes to more aggressively interfere with 
their digital infrastructure than other types of regimes, Figure 1 reveals that 
democracies also substantively disconnect their communication networks.  In recent 
years, there have been at least 80 incidents a year annually.  Only a fraction of these 
involve emerging democracies, but Figure 1 only begins the analysis.  Over time, it 
appears that all types of regimes have become more and more willing to interfere 
with information access.  As social media have diffused (since 2006), they have 
become a fundamental infrastructure for collective action. Even though democracies 
appear just as aggressive as authoritarian regimes in disconnecting digital networks, 
are there differences in the ways in which such states intervene?  What are the 
different reasons for such drastic interventions? 
Governments have offered a wide range of reasons for interfering with digital 
media. Most commonly, states interfere with digital networks with the goal of 
protecting political authority or preserving the public good.  The first broad theme of 
protecting leadership and state institutions included several kinds of reasons for state 
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interference in public access to social media. These reasons include: protecting 
political leaders and state institutions; election crisis; eliminating propaganda; 
mitigating dissidence; and national security. National security was the most 
commonly cited reason under this theme, where officials cited “terrorism threats” 
and preventing the spread of “state secrets” as reasons to intervene with Internet 
access. Information that undermined protection of authority figures in any way was 
another sub-category oft attributed for intervention. For example, in 2007 Kazakh 
officials shut down opposition websites for three days, because of published 
transcripts and recordings related to a public battle between authoritarian President 
Nazarbayev and his estranged son-in-law.  The eliminating propaganda sub-category 
included incidents where intervention occurred because of the spread of information 
aimed at serving an agenda undermining the standing regime. For example, China in 
2003 sentenced an individual to four years in prison for email discussions and 
postings in online forums and chat rooms related to democracy.  The mitigating 
dissidence sub-category captures those cases in which intervention was attributed to 
an attempt to reduce dissident civic action, such as the U.S. arresting two individuals 
who tweeted about police locations during G20 protests in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
in 2009. Incidents included under the election crisis sub-category include cases in 
which a regime acted in response to events surrounding elections. This sub-category 
included times when the regime intervened prior to, during, or after elections. For 
example, in the aftermath of the highly contested Iranian elections in 2009, the regime 
first slowed and then shut down access to the Twitter network, which was heavily 
used by protestors to coordinate and share information about the contested elections.   
The second over-arching reason for disabling social media was to the public good.  
Sub-categories of this theme include: preserving cultural and religious morals; 
preserving racial harmony; protecting children; cultural preservation; protecting 
individuals’ privacy; and dissuading criminal activity. Preserving cultural and religious 
morals was the most cited reason for intervention across all themes and categories. 
This sub-category was used in incidents when officials attributed intervention to 
preventing the spread of blasphemous or offensive information that challenged the 
religious and cultural morality of the state. An overwhelming number of these cases 
involved targeting websites and individuals who accessed or distributed anti-Islamic 
or pornographic material (not including child pornography, which was captured in a 
separate category). An illustration of such an incident is from 2009, when Pakistan 
blocked access to 450 sites including Facebook and YouTube after an international 
event to draw the prophet Mohammed was organized on Facebook. 
The lasting impact of a temporary disconnection in Internet service may actually 
be a strengthening of weak ties between global and local civil society networks.  
When civil society disappears from the grid, it is noticed.  What lasts are the ties 
between a nation’s civic groups, and between international non-governmental 
organizations and like-minded, in-country organizations.  Certainly not all of these 
virtual communities are about elections, but their existence is a political phenomenon 
particularly in countries where state and social elites have worked hard to police 
offline communities.  Thus, even the bulletin boards and chat rooms dedicated to 
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shopping for brand name watches are sites that practice free speech and where the 
defense of free speech can become a topic of conversation.  The Internet allows 
oppositions movements that are based outside of a country to reach in and become 
part of the system of political communication within even the strictest authoritarian 
regimes. Today, banning political parties could simply mean that formal political 
opposition is now organized online, from outside the country.  It could also means 
that civil society leaders turn to other organizational forms permitted by network 
technologies.  When states disconnect particular social media services, student and 
civil society leaders develop creative workarounds and relearn traditional (offline) 
mobilization tactics.  This almost always means that target sites, such as YouTube, 
Facebook, and Twitter, are accessible through other means. 
 
Conclusion:  Sensible Foreign Policy Objectives for the West 
The Internet has become an invaluable logistical tool for organization and 
communication for civil society groups. It is an information infrastructure mostly 
independent of the state, and since civil society groups are by definition social 
organizations independent of the state, the Internet has become an important 
incubator for social movements (radical and secular) and civic action.  The Internet 
has altered the dynamics of political communication systems in many countries, such 
that the Internet itself is the site of political contestation between the state and civil 
society. For these reasons, foreign policy objectives must include some sensible 
information infrastructure aspects.   
Increasingly, Western governments are advocating for open access to the Internet 
as a key element in foreign policy, and investing in online tools for promoting 
democratic values.  For example, the U.S. State Department has allocated some $28 
million to Internet Freedom programs around the world.  Still, there are several kinds 
of sensible foreign policy recommendations that could support the information 
infrastructure of civil society actors and allow people around the world access to 
international news content.  Policy goals could include: 
• Support net neutrality by enforcing and promoting policies for equal access 
and non-discrimination both at home and abroad. 
• Hold open conversations with U.S.-based firms that export censorship 
software, build kill-switches, or design user-policies that have an impact on 
how civic leaders organize popular democracy movements.   
• Support freedom of expression, particularly by having U.S. diplomats 
advocate for individual journalists—or citizen journalists—who have been 
arrested or harassed by repressive regimes. 
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• Avoid using information sanctions as a policy mechanism for punishing 
states.  Civil society actors also suffer when foreign governments impose 
restrictions on the flow of information. 
• Invest in broad digital literacy and technology development programs in 
developing countries, by supporting programs that educate citizens that 
support local sustainable innovation in communities. 
Information infrastructure is politics.  And the political culture that we now see 
online during elections comes not just from political elites, but from citizens: using 
social media, documenting human rights abuses with their mobile phones, sharing 
spreadsheets to track state expenditures, and pooling information about official 
corruption.  Perhaps the most lasting impact of digital media use during crises is that 
people get accustomed to being able to consume and produce political content.  When 
regimes disconnect from global information infrastructure, they employ a range of 
stop-gap measures that usually reinforces public expectations for global connectivity. 
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A case is defined as an occasion where a government intervened in a digital network 
by breaking or turning off connections between national sub-networks and global 
information networks.  Sometimes this meant blocking ports or access to a particular 
sub-network of digital media, such as content at the domains Facebook.com or 
YouTube.com.  In times of significant political or military crisis, such as war or 
contested elections, the governments might disconnect SMS messaging services or 
block the entire country’s access to global networks. Additionally, regimes may target 
individual actors in networks.  But these incidents are more than general government 
threats of surveillance or intimidation (which are also forms of censorship).  These are 
distinct incidents where government officials made the specific decision to disable the 
links or nodes in the portions of the information networks they can control. 
 
Since the literature on digital censorship often makes a distinction between 
democracies, emerging democracies and authoritarian regimes, we rely on the Polity 
IV data about regime type.  In addition, since several of the governments appearing 
in the event log are too fragile to sensibly be given one of these three categories, we 
rely on Polity IV data for a category of fragile regimes.  As per Polity IV coding, if a 
state was recovering from civil war or foreign military invasion, experiencing a 
complex humanitarian disaster, or had effectively failed for other reasons, we code 
this state as fragile.  A state’s regime type was set according to the Polity IV score for 
that state in the year of the reported incident.  Several countries had several incidents, 
and it is possible that regime types changed over time. 
 
All in all, there were 606 unique incidents involving 99 countries:  39 percent of the 
incidents occurred in democracies, 6 percent occurred in emerging democracies, 52 
percent occurred in authoritarian regimes, and 3 percent occurred in fragile states. 
Each incident was coded for the name of the country in which a state agency 
intervened in digital networks, the year of the incident, the type of regime, and a 
precise date if available.  We made general notes on the narrative of each incident, 
and mapped on the Polity IV score for the country in the year of the incident.  Then 
we developed three standardized typologies for the kinds of incidents being reported.  
First, we developed a category that iteratively helped define the case, and a typology 
of actions that states take against social media.  Second, we developed a category for 
why they took that action, sometimes relying on third-party reports if the state simply 
denied any interference.  Finally, we developed a category for the impact of the 
interference. 
